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DAVID J. DEMING
Iestimatetheimpactofattendingafirst-choicemiddleorhighschoolonadult
crime, using data from public school choice lotteries in Charlotte-Mecklenburg
school district (CMS). Seven years after random assignment, lottery winners had
been arrested for fewer serious crimes and had spent fewer days incarcerated.
Thegaininschool qualityas measuredbypeerandteacherinputs was equivalent
to moving from one of the lowest-ranked schools to one at the district average.
Thereductionincrimecomes largelyfromyears afterenrollment inthepreferred
school is complete. The impacts are concentrated among high-risk youth, who
commit about 50% less crime across several different outcome measures and
scalingsofcrimebyseverity.Ifindsuggestiveevidencethatschoolqualityexplains
more of the impact in high school, whereas peer effects are more important in
middle school. JEL Codes: I20, I21.
I. INTRODUCTION
Can improvement in the quality of public schools be
an effective crime prevention strategy? Criminal activity be-
gins in early adolescence and peaks when most youth should
still be enrolled in secondary school (Farrington et al. 1986;
Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin 1987; Levitt and Lochner 2001;
Sampson and Laub 2003). Crime is concentrated among mi-
nority males from high-poverty neighborhoods (Freeman 1994;
Pettit and Western 2004; Raphael and Sills 2007). An in-
fluential literature on “neighborhood effects” links criminal
activity to neighborhood disadvantage through peer interac-
tion models (Sah 1991; Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman
1996) or processes of socialization and collective efficacy
(Sampson, Raudenbush, andEarls 1997).
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 2064 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Schools maybea particularlyimportant settingfortheonset
of criminal behavior.1 Urban schools in high-poverty neighbor-
hoods havehighrates ofviolenceandschool dropout andstruggle
to retain effective teachers (Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2002;
Murnane2008; Cook, Gottfredson, andNa 2010). Only35% of in-
mates in U.S. correctional facilities earneda high school diploma
or higher, compared with 82% of the general population (Harlow
2003). The best existing empirical evidence of the link between
education and crime comes from Lochner and Moretti (2004),
who use changes in compulsory schooling and child labor laws
toestimate the effect of additional years of schooling on criminal
activity. But the intensive margin of school quality is potentially
more relevant for policy. In a human capital framework, low-
skilled youth will engage in crime early in life because of low
anticipated returns to schooling (Lochner 2004). If increased
quality raises the return to investment in schooling, youth will
stay in school longer, earn higher wages as adults, and commit
fewer crimes.2 Yet there is little evidence of the effect of school
quality on crime.3
In this article, I link a long and detailed panel of adminis-
trative data from Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district (CMS)
to arrest and incarceration records from Mecklenburg County
and the North Carolina Department of Corrections (NCDOC). In
2002, CMS implemented a district-wide open enrollment school
choice plan. Slots at oversubscribed schools were allocated by
random lottery. School choice in CMS was exceptionally broad-
based. Ninety-five percent of students submitted at least one
choice, and about 40% chose a nonguaranteed school. Youth at
1. Because most public schools’ assignment zones are defined by neigh-
borhood, disentangling the separate influences of neighborhoods and schools is
difficult. Jacob and Lefgren (2003) find that contemporaneous school enrollment
leads todecreases inpropertycrimebut increases inviolent crime, althoughtheir
sample is not representative of large urban school districts.
2. Additional compulsory schooling might accomplish the same goal, but the
range of options for policy makers is limited. The minimum school leaving age is
already 18 in 18 states, and enforcement of truancy laws is sporadic(Oreopoulos
2006). Also, the population of “never takers” (i.e., youth who would drop out of
school at the same age regardless of the law) might be particularly important.
3. Economic models of crime focus largely on changes in costs and benefits
of crimeforindividuals onthemarginof workandcriminal activity(Becker1968;
Ehrlich1973;Grogger1998;Freeman1994).AnotableexceptionisLochner(2004),
who examines the onset of criminal behavior in a life-cycle model of schooling,
crime, and work. A recent paper by Weiner, Lutz, and Ludwig (2009) finds a
significant decline in homicide following school desegregation.
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 BETTER SCHOOLS, LESS CRIME? 2065
higherexanteriskforcrimewereactuallymorelikelytochoosea
nonguaranteedschool,allayingconcernsabout“cream-skimming”
that might complicatetheexternal validityof thefindings (Epple
andRomano1998).
I estimatethecausal effect of winningthelotterytoattenda
first-choiceschool oncriminal activitythrough2009, 7 years after
random assignment. Across various schools and for both middle
andhigh school students, I findconsistent evidence that winning
thelotteryreducesadultcrime.4 Theeffectisconcentratedamong
African American males and youth who are at highest risk for
criminal involvement. Across several different outcomemeasures
and scalings of crime by severity, high-risk youth who win the
lotterycommit about 50% less crime. Theyarealsomorelikelyto
remain enrolled and “on track” in school, and they show modest
improvements on school-based behavioral outcomes such as ab-
sences and suspensions. However, there is no detectable impact
on test scores for any youth in the sample.
Nearly all of the reduction in crime occurs after enrollment
in the preferred school is complete. Differences between lottery
winners andlosers persist 4–7 years after random assignment in
both the middle and high school samples. The changes in peer
and teacher quality experienced by lottery winners are roughly
equivalent in magnitude tomoving from one of the worst schools
in the district to a school of average quality. Because nearly
all of the lottery applicants stayed in CMS, winners and losers
attendedschoolswithsimilarbudgetsandgovernancestructures.
There were noadditional community-level interventions, such as
in the Harlem Children’s Zone (Dobbie and Fryer 2009). In sum,
a treatment of between 1 and 4 years of enrollment in a higher
quality public school led to large and persistent reductions in
young adult criminal activity.
The pattern of results is consistent with at least twodistinct
explanations. Human capital theory predicts that offering youth
admissiontoa betterschool wouldraisethereturntoinvestment
in schooling, keeping them enrolled longer and increasing their
opportunitycostofcrimeasadults(Lochner2004).5 However, the
results are also consistent with a model of peer influence where
4. Youth age 16 and above are considered “adult” by the criminal justice
system in North Carolina. I donot observe juvenile crime.
5. This presumes that crime-prone youth are forward-looking and respond
rationallytoahigherreturnonschoolinginvestment. However, LeeandMcCrary
(2005) find that youth in Florida do not respond to the discontinuous change in
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 2066 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
differential exposure to crime-prone youth exerts a long-lasting
influence on adult crime. To test these different hypotheses, I
perform some back-of-the-envelope calculations using the esti-
matedchanges in enrollment andexposure tocrime-prone peers.
I find suggestive evidence that the impacts in high school are
more attributable to gains in school quality, whereas the results
in middle school are driven more by peer effects. An important
caveat, however, isthatthelotterysampleisself-selected. Ifhigh-
risk lottery applicants are in the sample because they (or their
families) are trying toescape the negative influence of particular
peers in their neighborhood schools, the impact of winning the
lottery could be driven by match-specific peer effects that would
not showupin the calculations.
Each of these mechanisms has different implications for the
aggregateeffectofschoolchoiceoncrime.Iftheimpactsaredriven
by an improvement in school quality that is invariant to peer
group composition, then a lottery that holds school size constant
wouldhavenoaggregateeffectoncrime. AsIdiscussinSectionV,
however, CMS expanded capacity at highly demanded schools,
andmanyneighborhoodschoolsintheinnercitylostasubstantial
share of enrollment. In that case, increased school quality would
reduce crime absent any impact of changing peer composition.
I show that the net effect of school choice was to distribute
high-risk youth more evenly across schools than what would
have happened with neighborhood school assignment. Available
evidence on the functional form of peer effects suggests that
concentrations of high-risk youth increase the aggregate level of
misbehavior, and I find some evidence of that pattern of peer
effectsinCMSmiddleschools(CookandLudwig2005; Imberman,
Kugler, andSacerdote2011; Carrell andHoekstra2010). Finally,
since improvements in measured school quality and peer compo-
sition do not explain much of the impact of winning the lottery
on crime, we might conclude that better matching of students to
schools plays an important role. This is another channel through
which school choice could be welfare-enhancing (Hoxby 2003).
Though the balance of the evidence points toward school choice
leading toa net reduction in crime, extrapolation from the direct
effect on lottery applicants is speculative and should be viewed
with caution.
expected punishment at the age of majority, suggesting that they are impatient,
myopic, or both.
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 BETTER SCHOOLS, LESS CRIME? 2067
Iexploittherichnessofprelotteryadministrativedataandes-
timatetheprobabilitythatayouthwillbearrestedinthefutureas
afunctionofdemographics, prioracademicperformance, behavior
in school, and detailed neighborhood characteristics. The effect
on crime of winning admission to a preferred school is strongly
increasing in this ex ante prediction. Thus societal welfare gains
from targeting resources to these youth might be substantial
(Donohue and Siegelman 1998). Although random assignment
of slots to oversubscribed schools is an ideal research design,
it may be suboptimal from a welfare perspective if treatment
effects can be predictedon the basis of observable characteristics
(BhattacharyaandDupas2008). Isimulatetheeffectofallocating
slotsbasedonexantecrimeriskratherthanatrandom, andIfind
that this would reduce the social cost of crime by an additional
27%. Althoughthis allocationmethodis controversial (andinthe
case of race, illegal), it was executed at least in part by CMS,
whichgavea “priorityboost”inthelotterytoapplicants whomet
an income standard based on eligibility for free or reduced-price
school lunches. I estimate that this priority boost lowered crime
by 12%, relative to a lottery without priority groups such as the
ones typically administeredby U.S. charter schools.
Several recent papers have found large positive impacts on
test scores of winning admission to an oversubscribed public or
charter school using a lottery-based design (Hastings, Kane, and
Staiger 2008; Hoxby and Murarka 2009; Angrist et al. 2010;
Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011; Dobbie and Fryer 2011). Although
these short-term test score gains are promising, data limitations
have prohibited examination of longer term outcomes measured
outside the school setting.
Thereareat least tworeasons wemight want tolookbeyond
test scores and other school-based measures. First, there is an
emergingliteratureontheunintendedconsequencesoftest-based
accountability, which range from neglect of nontested subjects
to manipulation of the nutritional content of school lunches and
outright teacher cheating (Jacob and Levitt 2003; Figlio and
Winicki 2005; Jacob 2005; Figlio 2006). This leads to concerns
that schools may raise student test scores through methods
that do not translate to long-term improvements in skills or
educational attainment. Second, even in the absence of distor-
tionary incentives, the correlation between test score gains and
improvements in long-term outcomes has not been conclusively
established.Studiesthatrelatetestscorestoearningslaterinlife,
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 2068 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
while suggestive, are not well-identified (Murnane, Willett, and
Levy 1995; Jencks and Phillips 1999; Currie and Thomas 2001).
Furthermore, studies of early life and school-age interventions
often find long-term impacts on outcomes such as educational
attainment, earnings and criminal activity, despite nonexistence
or “fade out” of test score gains (Krueger and Whitmore 2001;
Gould, Lavy, and Paserman 2004; Belfield et al. 2006; Kemple
and Willner 2008; Deming 2009). Thus programs can yield long-
termbenefits without raisingtest scores, andtest scoregains are
noguaranteethat impacts will persist overtime. Takentogether,
the results here and in other studies suggest that looking only
at test score gains may miss important benefits of interventions,
particularly for disadvantagedyouth.
This article uses random assignment to examine the longer
termimpactofschoolchoiceoncrime, animportantadultoutcome
measured outside the school setting. The most similar study to
this one is Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006), who estimate the
impactofwinninganadmissionslotterytoattendaChicagopublic
highschoolonavarietyofoutcomes. Theyfindnoimpactofschool
choiceontestscoresorgraduationbutsomebenefitsonbehavioral
outcomes, includingself-reportedcriminal activityandincarcera-
tionduringtheyears inwhicha student is enrolled.6 This article
improves onthosefindings ina numberof ways. Most important,
the results in Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) are based on self-
reported arrests in a survey administered in ninth grade, just
9 months after lottery participants enroll in high school. Recent
evidence from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) Demonstration
suggests that youth significantly underreport criminal activity
and that the probability of under reporting might be positively
correlatedwithtreatment.7 Furthermore, evenifunderreporting
is orthogonal tolottery status, differences in police presence and
6. Lavy (2010) studies public school choice in Tel Aviv using differences-in-
differencesandregressiondiscontinuitymethods,andfindsevidenceofareduction
in self-reportedviolence andclassroom disruption.
7. InKling, Ludwig, andKatz (2005), 29% of maleyouthinthecontrol group
and 30% in the treatment group self-report having ever been arrested, while the
administrative data showrates of 39% and44% for control andtreatment males,
respectively (Table IV). While the treatment-control reporting difference is not
statistically significant, Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005) estimate that uniform
under reporting of arrests can explain less than one-tenth of the treatment-
control difference (note 22). Here and in Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006), lottery
winners knowtheir treatment status andmay alsobe exposedtodifferent norms
ofbehaviorintheirchosenschool. This raises concerns that lotterywinners might
be more likely than lottery losers tounderreport their own criminal activity.
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 BETTER SCHOOLS, LESS CRIME? 2069
tracking of student misbehavior across schools might complicate
the interpretation of the findings in the first few years.8 I over-
come these limitations by tracking detailedmeasures of criminal
activity using administrative data, and for 7 years after random
assignment, longafterenrollmentintheinitialschooliscomplete.
This article provides some evidence that schooling exerts
a particularly strong influence on criminal behavior. The MTO
Demonstration found mixed impacts on crime (Ludwig, Duncan,
and Hirschfield 2001; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 2005). In MTO,
the male children of housing voucher recipients committedfewer
violent crimes initially but more property crimes 3–4 years after
randomassignment. Similarly, Jacob(2004)findsnoindependent
impact on academicoutcomes of moving out of high-density pub-
lic housing. In contrast, the CMS open enrollment plan can be
thoughtofasapureschoolmobilityexperiment. InbothMTOand
the middle school sample here, there was nooverall reduction in
crime, only a substitution toward property crime and away from
violent crime (along the intensive margin of crime severity).
Inbothsettings, changingpeergroups seemedtobethemost
important mechanismforreductions inviolent crime, sincegains
in measured school quality were modest and reflected changing
demographics (Sanbonmatsuet al. 2006). Whywas therenolong-
run reduction in criminal behavior along the extensive margin?
One potential explanation is that although changes in social
setting can reduce violent crime by limiting interactions between
high-risk youth, persistent reductions in criminality are difficult
to achieve without affecting skills and/or employability. This is
consistent with the pattern of results for high school lottery
winners, where there was an overall reduction in arrests and
more evidence of increases in (nonpeer) school quality. However,
more research is neededtodisentangle the relative contributions
of neighborhoods and schools, and these conclusions are at best
suggestive.
8. If, for example, the schools to which lottery applicants are assigned have
more police in the school building or handle disciplinary incidents more strictly,
winning the lottery to attend a “better” school might decrease the probability of
being arrestedconditional on the level of “true”criminal activity. In other words,
thereductioninarrests is mechanical andnot atruedeclineincriminal behavior.
This is more likely tobe true for some crimes than others (i.e., disorderly conduct
versus armed robbery), but the survey in Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) only
asks whetherastudent has beenarrestedinthepast year, withnoinformationon
crime type.
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II. DATA DESCRIPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS
II.A. Data
Withover150,000 students enrolledinthe2008–2009 school
year, CMS is the 20th largest school district in the nation. The
CMS attendance area encompasses all of Mecklenburg County,
including the entire city of Charlotte and several surrounding
cities. Since the mid-1990s, the North Carolina Department of
Public Instruction (NCDPI) has required all districts to submit
a set of end-of-year (EOY) files that include demographic infor-
mation, attendanceandbehavioraloutcomes, yearlytestscoresin
mathandreadingforgrades3through8,andsubject-specifictests
for higher grades. Internal CMS files obtained under a data use
agreement alsoincludeidentifyinginformationsuchas nameand
dateofbirth, andstudents’ exact addresses ineveryyear, whichI
use tocreate detailed geographicidentifiers. For more details on
the nature and quality of the CMS administrative data, see the
Online Appendix.
I match CMS administrative data toarrest records from the
MecklenburgCountySheriff(MCS).9 Iobtainthesearrestrecords
directlyfromtheMCSwebsite, whichmaintainsanonlinesearch-
able database that covers arrests in the county for the previous 3
years, counting from the day the website is accessed.10 The data
include all arrests of adults (age 16 and over in North Carolina)
that occurredinthecounty, eveniftheywerehandledbyanother
agency. Arrestees are tracked across incidents using a unique
identifier that is established with fingerprinting. Critically, each
observation includes the name anddate of birth of the criminal.
The match was done using name and date of birth and was
exact in about 87% of cases. I obtained the remaining matches
using an algorithm that assigns potential matches a score based
on the number and nature of differences.11 I investigated match
9. Because CMS is a unified school district, the geographic coverage of the
school administrative data andthe arrest records is identical.
10. The web address is http://arrestinquiryweb.co.mecklenburg.nc.us/. I ob-
tained the data by writing a script that loops over arrest numbers in consecutive
orderandcopies therelevant informationintoatext file. SeetheOnlineAppendix
for details.
11. As a specification check I ran the partial match algorithm a number of
different ways, and I also estimated all the results in the article using exact
matches only. The results were almost identical. Also, to address concern that
match quality might be correlated with subsequent school quality, I reran the
match using only name and date of birth information that was available prior
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 BETTER SCHOOLS, LESS CRIME? 2071
qualityinseveraldifferentways, whichareoutlinedintheOnline
Appendix.12 Since the CMS open enrollment plan began in 2002,
someoldermembers ofthesamplecouldhavebeenarrestedprior
to2006, when the arrest data begin. Toaddress this issue, I also
obtainedhistorical arrest records directlyfromMCS formembers
of the lottery sample only. Finally, I add incarceration records
from the MCS jail system andthe North Carolina Department of
Corrections (NCDOC). These county jail andstate prison records
are consistently available beginning only in 2006, and they were
collected only for African American male members of the lottery
sample.13 The data include number of days incarcerated, but
probation and parole records are not included. See the Online
Appendixformoredetailsonthecollectionandcodingofthearrest
andincarceration data.
II.B. School Choice in Charlotte-Mecklenburg
From 1971 until 2001, CMS schools were forcibly deseg-
regated under a court order. Students were bused all around
the district to preserve racial balance in schools. After several
years of legal challenges, the court order was overturned, and
CMS was instructed that it could no longer determine student
assignments based on race. In December 2001 the CMS School
Board voted on a policy of district-wide open enrollment for
the 2002–2003 school year. School boundaries were redrawn as
contiguous neighborhood zones, and children who lived in each
zone received guaranteed access to their neighborhood school.
The 1-year change in student assignments was dramatic—about
40% of students at the middle and high school level were as-
signed to a different school than in the previous year. Because
the inner city of Charlotte is dense and highly segregated,
African American and poor students were even more likely to be
reassigned.
tothe lottery. About 175 matches were lost with this restriction, but only 7 were
in the lottery sample. The results were substantively unchanged. See the Online
Appendix for details.
12. Thesesteps includeverifyingthat therearenolargetimegaps inthedata,
that the age anddemographicprofile of arrests fits other studies, andthat a high
percentage of arrests among age-appropriate youth in Mecklenburg County are
successfully matchedtoCMS data. See the Online Appendix for details.
13. The data are limited to African American males because I was unable to
automate the collection process as well as for the arrest data. See the Online
Appendix for details.
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 2072 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
The open enrollment lottery took place in spring 2002. CMS
conducted an extensive outreach campaign to ensure that choice
wasbroad-based,and95%ofparentssubmittedatleastonechoice
(Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2008). Parents could submit up to
three choices (not including their neighborhoodschool). Students
were guaranteedaccess totheir neighborhoodschool, andadmis-
sion for all other students was subject to grade-specific capacity
limits that wereset bythedistrict beforehandbut wereunknown
tofamilies at thetimeof thelottery(Hastings, Kane, andStaiger
2008). When demand for slots among nonguaranteed applicants
exceeded supply, admission was allocated by random lotteries
according tothe following strictly orderedpriority groups:
1. Studentsthatattendedtheschoolinthepreviousyearand
their siblings.
2. Free or reduced-price lunch eligible (i.e. low-income,
FRPL) students applying to schools where less than half
of the previous year’s school population was FRPL.
3. Students applying to a school within their own “choice
zone.”14
Applicants were sorted by priority group according to these
rules and then assigned a random lottery number. Slots at each
school were first filled by students with guaranteed access, and
thenremainingslotswereofferedtostudentswithineachpriority
group in order of their lottery numbers. CMS administered all of
thelotteries centrallyandappliedanalgorithmknownas a “first
choice maximizer” (Abdulkadiroglu and Somnez 2003). Although
this typeofmechanismis not strategy-proof, Hastings, Kane, and
Staiger (2008) findlittle evidence of strategicchoice by parents.
I begin with the full sample of middle and high school ap-
plicants. Since nearly all rising 12th graders received their first
choice, I restrict the analysis sample to grades 6 through 11.
Next I exclude the 5% of students who were not enrolled in any
CMS school in the previous year. These students were much
less likely to be enrolled in CMS in the following fall. Because
previous enrollment was fixed at the time of the lottery, this
14. CMS divided schools into four “choice zones” and guaranteed transporta-
tion for students whoappliedtoa school within their zone. This includedmagnet
schools. Thezoneswereconstructedsothattherewasanevenmixofmostlywhite
“suburban” and mostly black “inner-city” schools in each zone. In practice, this
prioritygroupwasrarelyusedsinceveryfewstudentsappliedoutsidetheirchoice
zone.
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 BETTER SCHOOLS, LESS CRIME? 2073
restrictiondoes not bias theresults. Theanalysis sampleconsists
of21,132 highschoolstudentsand22,896 middleschoolstudents.
The first column of Table I contains summary statistics for this
sample. About 60% of the sample chose (and were automatically
admitted to) their neighborhood school first. As shown in col-
umn (2) of Table I, the remaining 40% are more likely to be
black and free lunch eligible, and they had lower test scores and
higherrates ofabsenceandout-of-school suspensions. About 75%
of applicants to nonguaranteed schools were in lottery priority
groups where the probability of admission was either 0 or 1.
Even though these students chose a nonguaranteedschool, there
is no random variation in admission to exploit. In column (3)
of Table I we see that the lottery subsample is similar to other
applicants to nonguaranteed schools. The final lottery sample
consists of 1,891 high school students and 2,320 middle school
students.
Under busing schools were racially balanced, but the sur-
rounding neighborhoods remained highly segregated. Thus the
redrawing of school boundaries led to concentrations of minority
students in some schools. Students who were assigned to these
schools attempted to get out of them. Figure I displays the
strong correlation between the racial composition of a school’s
neighborhood zone and the percent of students assigned to it
who choose not to attend. Unlike many other studies of school
choice, applicants to nonguaranteed schools are more disadvan-
taged than students who choose their neighborhood school.15
Evenwithinhigh-minorityschools, fromwhichmostofthesample
is drawn, lottery applicants are similar in terms of race, socioe-
conomic status, and average test scores to students who chose
to remain in their neighborhood schools.16 Still, since lottery
applicants had different preferences than their peers who chose
tostayintheneighborhoodschool, theymaydifferonunobserved
dimensions.
15. See Online Appendix Table II for an analysis of selection into the lottery
sample in a regression framework.
16. I test this by estimating a regression of the percent who listed the neigh-
borhood school as their first choice on indicators for race and free lunch status,
prior test scores, and home school fixed effects. In the full sample, students who
chose their neighborhood school are about 10 percentage points more likely tobe
whiteand8 percentagepoints less likelytobefreeluncheligible, but havesimilar
averagetest scores. WhenI restrict thesampletoschools that aremorethan60%
nonwhite, the coefficients get smaller (5 and3 percentage points) andmarginally
significant, andthe results for test scores are unchanged.
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FIGURE I
Students in High Minority School Zones More Likely toExercise Choice
CMS was divided into geographic catchment areas for the 2002–2003 school
year and students were assigned to a neighborhood school zone based on their
home address. The y-axis shows the share of students in the catchment area that
chose their neighborhood school in spring 2002. The x-axis shows the percent of
students in each catchment area that are nonwhite (based on their spring 2002
home addresses). Middle schools are students in rising grades 6–8 for fall 2002.
Sinceweexclude12th-gradestudents inthemainanalysis, thehighschool means
are basedon students whowill be in grades 9–11 in fall 2002.
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND IMPACT OF WINNING THE LOTTERY
ON ENROLLMENT
If lottery numbers are randomly assigned, the winners and
losers of each lottery will on average have identical observed
andunobservedcharacteristics. Thus withsufficient samplesize,
a simple comparison of mean outcomes between winners and
losers wouldidentify the causal effect of winning each individual
lottery. However, thesamplehereis not largeenoughtoestimate
the effect of winning each individual lottery. Instead, following
Cullen, Jacob, andLevitt(2006), Iestimateordinaryleastsquares
regressions of the form:
(1) Yij = δWij + βXij + Γj + εij.
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Yij is an outcome variable of interest for student i in lottery
j ∙ Wij is an indicator variable equal to 1 if student i in lottery j
had a winning randomly assigned lottery number, and 0 if not.
Xij is a vector of covariates included for balance, Γj is a set of
lottery (i.e., choice by grade by priority group) fixed effects, and
 ij is a stochastic error term. I consider only first choices, so
the number of observations is equal to the number of students
in the lottery sample. In principle I could estimate a nested
model that incorporates multiple choices. However, in practice
nearly every student who did not receive their first choice was
eitherautomaticallyadmittedtotheirsecondchoice(if it was not
oversubscribed)orautomaticallydeniedbecausealltheslotswere
already filled.
Lottery fixed effects are necessary to ensure that the prob-
ability of admission to a first-choice school is uncorrelated with
omitted variables in the error term. If, for example, savvy par-
ents had some prior knowledge about the chance of admis-
sion, they might (all else equal) apply to schools where the
probability of acceptance was higher. Thus comparing winners
and losers across different lotteries might lead to a biased es-
timate. In the specification in Equation (1), the δ coefficient
gives the weighted average difference in outcomes between win-
ners and losers across all lotteries, with weights equal to the
number of students in the lottery times p   (1 − p) where
p is the probability of admission (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt
2006). Thus δ represents the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect of
winning admission to a first-choice school for students in pri-
ority groups with nondegenerate lotteries. I cannot estimate
the effect of attending a school for students with guaranteed
access.
If the lotteries were conducted correctly, there should be no
difference between winners and losers on any characteristicthat
isfixedatthetimeofapplication. Itestthisdirectlybyestimating
Equation (1) with pretreatment covariates such as race, gender,
andpriortestscoresasoutcomes.Theresults,inthelastcolumnof
TableI,showthatthelotterywasbalancedonobservablesandthe
randomizationseemstohavebeenconductedcorrectly. Evenwith
properrandomization,however,theestimatescouldstillbebiased
by selective attrition if leaving CMS or Mecklenburg County is
correlated with winning the lottery. Since high school dropout
rates are high for crime-prone youth, selective attrition is a seri-
ous concernforoutcomes that comefromtheCMS administrative
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data. Students who drop out of school and are subsequently
arrested in Mecklenburg County, however, are included in the
data. Thus the main issue is selective migration. If lottery losers
are more likely to leave the county, they may commit crimes in
other jurisdictions. This would bias estimates downward. On the
other hand, lottery winners may perform better in school and
be more likely to leave the county to go to college, for example.
This would bias the estimates upward. Even so, there are a few
reasons tothinkthat selectivemigrationis not muchofa concern
here.First,thepopulationofcrime-proneyouthisnotverymobile.
Attrition in grades K through 8 (where dropout is less of an
issue) is negatively correlated with other predictors of crime and
is much lower than average among future criminals.17 Second,
CMSassignsawithdrawalcodetostudentswholeavethedistrict,
and lottery status is uncorrelated with the code for out-of-county
transfers. Additionally, the NCDOC state prison data includes
informationoncountyofarrest. Less than1% ofthesamplespent
timeinstateprisonforoffensescommittedoutsideofMecklenburg
County, and there is no difference between lottery winners and
losers.
III.A. Predictors of Crime and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Most members of the lottery sample are probably not at
high risk for criminal offending. Likewise, a small percentage of
high-rate offenders are responsible for a large share of crimes
(Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin 1987; Freeman 1994). To test for
heterogeneous treatment effects, I exploit the unusually long
and rich panel of administrative data from CMS. Students with
adult arrest records can be tracked all the way back to kinder-
garten in some cases, with yearly information on test scores
and behavior and detailed neighborhood measures. I combine
all of the individual correlates of criminal behavior into a sin-
gle index and plot the treatment as a function of this ex ante
crime risk. I estimate the probability that a student will have
at least one arrest as a function of their history of test scores
and behavior measures, demographic characteristics, and neigh-
borhood of residence. These measures are strong predictors of
17. Ninety-one percent of future felons who were enrolled in CMS in fourth
grade were still enrolled 4 years later (what would have been their eighth-grade
year). The overall average is 80%.
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future criminality.18 See Online Appendix Table III for more
details on the estimation andfor regression coefficients from this
prediction.
In column (4) of Table I, I present the average characteris-
tics of youth who are in the top risk quintile according to this
prediction. About 90% of the high risk sample is comprised of
free lunch–eligible African American males. Their test scores are
on average one standard deviation below the North Carolina
state average, and they are absent and suspended many more
days than the average student. Because the high-risk students
are overwhelmingly male, I exclude females from all subsequent
analyses.19
Totestforthepossibilityofheterogeneoustreatmenteffects,I
rankmaleyouthaccordingtotheirarrestriskandsplitthesample
intofive quintiles. I then estimate:
(2) Yij =
5 X
q=1
δqWij +
5 X
q=1
φq(1 − Wij)+ βXij + Γj + εij,
where q indexes risk quintiles, and the rest of the notation is
similar to Equation (1). Separate coefficients by risk quintile
for lottery winners δq and lottery losers φq allow me to test
the hypotheses that lottery winners and losers are equal over-
all and within each quintile and that the arrest risk quintiles
are statistically different overall or within each group. I first
estimate Equation (2) for the main crime outcomes and plot
the treatment effects andassociatedconfidence intervals against
each risk quintile. I then estimate simpler models where the
first through fourth quintiles are pooled but the lottery is al-
lowed to have a different effect on the top quintile “high-risk”
youth.
18. The pseudo R-squared from the regression is about 0.23, compared with
0.24 when high school graduation is the dependent variable. Joint tests for the
significanceofeachtypeofcoefficientyieldchi-squaredvaluesof147fortestscores,
471 for behavior, and249 for neighborhoodfixedeffects.
19. I showintheOnlineAppendixTableIV that thenumberof arrests among
females is extremely low, particularly for serious crimes. The crime prediction
model greatly understates actual gender gaps in criminal offending. One way
to show this is to regress a crime outcome such as felony arrests on the arrest
prediction plus indicators for gender, race, and free lunch status. The male
coefficient comes inhighlysignificant, whileraceandfreelunchareinsignificant,
suggestingthatthemodeldoesnotdoagoodjobaccountingforgenderdifferences.
Results withfemales includedarequalitativelysimilar, but donot identify“high-
risk”youth as accurately.
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III.B. Impact of Winning the Lottery on Measures of Enrollment
and School Quality
Table II presents enrollment impacts in the years following
thelottery. Columns(1)through(4)presentresultsforhighschool
lottery applicants; columns (5) through (8) show the same for
middle school applicants. The coefficients come from a regression
like Equation (2), but with the lowest four risk quintiles pooled
together and a separate estimate for the top risk quintile. The
odd-numbered columns present control means for the estimates
in each row. Below each estimate and in subsequent tables, I
report standarderrors that areclusteredat theindividual lottery
(i.e., choice by grade by priority group) level. The first rowshows
the effect of winning the lottery on attendance at a student’s
first choice school in spring of the 2002–2003 school term, a year
after the lottery was conducted. The first stage is strong—lottery
winners in all groups are over 55 percentage points more likely
than losers to attend their first-choice school. The coefficient is
less than1 mainlybecausesomelotterylosers successfullyenroll
in their first choice anyway.20 For the main results herein, I
report ITT estimates of the effect of winning the lottery. Later I
discussresultsthatusethelotteryasaninstrumentalvariablefor
several of the outcomes in Tables II andIII. Because a nontrivial
fractionoflotterylosersstillmanagetoenroll, theseestimatesare
not generalizable toall lottery applicants. Instead, they are local
average treatment effects (LATEs) for students whocomply with
their lottery status (Angrist, Imbens, andRubin 1996).
Thesecondrowshowstheeffectofwinningthelotteryontotal
years enrolled in the first-choice school. The third row expresses
the change in enrollment as a proportion of the total that was
possible for a student that was progressing on time, and the
fourth row shows the percentage of students who were enrolled
for the maximum number of years. This number ranges from 1
(for 8th and 12th grade students) to 4 (for 9th grade students.)
Thetreatment consistedof1 to1.5 additional years ofenrollment
on average, or about a 35 to 50 percentage point increase as a
shareoftotalpossibleenrollment.Theeffectsizesareabitsmaller
20. Somestudentsmovedintotheschool’sneighborhoodzoneinsummer2002,
afterlosingthelottery. Somelotterieswereforspecialprogramswithinschools, so
a student might have been deniedadmission tothe special program but accepted
to the regular school. Finally, some students may have been admitted at the
beginning of the school year when lottery winners didnot enroll.
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for high-risk youth, but relative to a much lower baseline. This
suggests that the treatment “dose” was proportionally larger for
high-risk youth. The fifth row shows the effect of winning the
lotteryonattendanceat thestudent’s neighborhoodschool, which
ishighlynegativeforallgroups.About40%to55%oflotterylosers
enrolledintheirneighborhoodschool infall 2002, comparedwith
fewer than 5% of high school lottery winners and 15% to 20% of
middle school lottery winners. The sixth row shows the impact
of winning the lottery on the probability of switching schools
during the 2002–2003 school year. High-risk lottery winners in
high school are 12 percentage points less likely toswitch schools,
but thereis nostatisticallysignificant impact onhigh-riskmiddle
school applicants.
The rest of Table II presents impacts on enrollment by type
of school from 2003 to 2006. The results for spring 2003 consist
of five mutually exclusive options—the student is either in their
first-choiceschool, intheirneighborhood(or“home”)school, notin
anyCMSschool,inanalternativeschoolforyouthwithbehavioral
problems, or held back to elementary/middle school, in another
regularschool. A fewresults arenotable. Less than10% oflottery
winners in the top risk quintile return to their neighborhood
schools, compared with 25% to 30% for lottery losers. Although
there is noimpact on dropout, high school lottery winners in the
top risk quintile are over 50% less likely to be in an alternative
school in spring 2003. In subsequent years I restrict to the first
three options, with other schools as the left-out category. In each
year I exclude lottery applicants for whom “on-time” progression
would result in matriculation from the school (i.e., rising eighth
gradeapplicantsareonlyinthespring2003middleschoolsample,
since they wouldmove on tohigh school in 2004).21
The effect of winning the lottery on enrollment in a first-
choice school remains statistically significant in all years. Yearly
attrition from the first-choice school (observed by comparing the
first-choice enrollment results by year), however, is higher for
high-risk youth andfor the high school sample overall, primarily
21. Sample sizes decrease by year as a result of this restriction. The 2006
results are only for the 645 rising 9th grade male applicants (who would have
been in 12th grade by 2006). For high school applicants, the other sample sizes
are905 (9thand10thgrade) forthe2005 outcomes and1,014 (9th, 10thand11th
grade) for the 2003 and 2004 outcomes. For middle school applicants, the sample
sizes are 561 for the 2005 outcomes (6th grade only), 824 for the 2004 outcomes
(6th and7th grade), and1,081 (6th, 7th and8th grade) for the 2003 outcomes.
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becauseofdropout. Dropout rates areextremelyhighamonghigh
school youthinthetopriskquintile. Theshareof lotterywinners
in their neighborhood schools remains low in subsequent years.
For middle school lottery winners, nearly all of the attrition in
first-choice enrollment is accounted for by other regular CMS
middleschools. Notably, risingsixth-gradelotterywinners inthe
topriskquintileare63% (12 percentagepoints)lesslikelytohave
left CMS by spring 2005, their eighth-grade year.
Table III shows the effect of winning the lottery on school
characteristics. The first three rows show the racial and family
income composition of the school and on distance to assigned
school. High school lottery winners attend schools that are de-
mographically very similar to the schools attended by lottery
losers, whereas middle school winners attend schools that are
less African American and higher income on average. All lottery
winners travel farther to attend their first-choice school, but the
distance is greater for high school students.
The next seven rows of Table III show the effect of winning
the lottery on various measures of school quality. I first test the
impact of winning the lottery on peers’ average math scores in
the year prior tothe lottery.22 High school lottery winners in the
topriskquintileandall middleschool lotterywinners experience
modest increases in peer test scores of about 0.15 standard de-
viations. The next row shows the impact of winning the lottery
on peers’ average predicted criminality. I use the results from
the estimation procedure outlined in Section III.A., where peer
groups are a student’s school and grade, and I exclude members
of the lottery sample from calculation of the average.23 Lottery
winners in the top risk quintile experience modest decreases in
the predicted criminality of peers. The results are about 75%
largerandestimatedmorepreciselyforthemiddleschoolsample.
We can interpret this coefficient as the change in the predicted
percentageof a student’s cohort that will haveanarrest record—
forexample, middleschool lotterywinners inthetopriskquintile
22. Since state-standardizedexams are administeredin math andreading up
to grade 8, I use the prior (2001–2002) year’s exam for rising grades 6 to 9, but
data from earlier years for grade 10 and 11. The lottery sample is excluded from
calculation of the average. Results for the reading test score are very similar.
23. I use grade-specific peer criminality because of the change in school
assignments inthe2002–2003 year. A student’s class compositioncanoftendiffer
substantially from the other cohorts in the school. The results from an overall
school mean, however, are very similar.
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attend schools where 15.8% of students are predicted to have an
arrest record, comparedwith 17.9% for lottery losers.
The next four rows present results for four measures of
teacher quality—the fraction of novice (defined by the NCDPI as
less than 3 years of experience) teachers, the fraction of teachers
that are newtothe school that year, the percent of teachers with
an advanced degree, and the share of teachers that attended a
“highlycompetitive”collegeasdefinedbytheBarron’srankings.24
Lotterywinnersinthetopriskquintileshowimprovementsonall
four measures of teacher quality, although the results are larger
andmoreoftenstatisticallysignificant inthehighschool sample.
The revealed preference measure is the school residual from a
conditional logistic regression that predicts the probability that
students will list eachschool as theirfirst choice, conditional ona
third-order polynomial in distance and home school fixed effects.
Lottery winners attend schools that are more preferred overall,
andtheimpacts arelargerforthehighschool sample. This is per-
haps unsurprisingbecauseonlyoversubscribedschools areinthe
lottery sample, but the relative magnitudes are informative. The
finalqualitymeasureisanindicatorforwhetherastudentattends
a magnet school. Magnet school enrollment comprises a larger
share of the treatment in the high school sample, mostly due to
the opening of a new magnet high school (Philip Berry Academy
of Technology, a “career academy”that focuses on vocational and
technical education)inthe2002–2003 school year. This is notable
since a recent randomized evaluation of the Career Academies
program found that male participants had substantially higher
earningsafter9yearsoffollow-up,despitenoimpactontestscores
or high school graduation (Kemple and Willner 2008). Overall,
lotterywinnersattendschoolsthatarebetteroneverydimension.
Across multiple measures, the gain in school quality for high-
risk youth is larger than for the overall sample and starts from
a much lower baseline, as indicated by the control means in
each odd-numbered column. For youth in the top risk quintile,
the gain in measured quality is roughly equivalent to moving
24. Thefirst threemeasures aretakenfromschool averages that arereported
on the NCDPI website, while the last measure comes from CMS administrative
data. Data on college attended is missing for about 35% of teachers overall, and
theshareishigherfortheschoolsattendedby“high-risk”students. Forallofthese
measures, thelackofstudent-teachermatcheddatameansIamunabletotellhow
much of the increased teacher quality is actually experienced by lottery winners.
Jackson (2009) shows that teachers in CMS switch schools in response tothe end
of busing.
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from one of the lowest-ranked schools to one around the district
average.
The last five rows of Table III showthe effect of winning the
middle school lottery on high school characteristics. The sample
is by necessity limited to students who were still enrolled in
CMS in ninth grade. Although middle school lottery winners
appeartoattendbetterschoolsinitially, thesegainsdonotextend
beyond the initial treatment. There is no statistically significant
impact of winning the middle school lottery on the demographic
composition, average test scores, or predicted criminality. How-
ever, as we saw in Table II, winning the lottery has an impact
on whether students remain in CMS through the end of eighth
grade. In the last row of Table III, I reestimate the impact
on peer criminality except I include the missing students and
assign them peers with predicted criminality that is equal to
the mean of their own risk quintile. Effectively, I am assuming
that when they drop out, they associate with other students like
them. With this admittedly imperfect measure of peer groups,
we see that middle school lottery winners in the top risk quin-
tile have peers that are statistically significantly less crime
prone.
IV. RESULTS
IV.A. Crime
Not all crimes are equal. Serious violent crimes such as
murder, rape, and armed robbery exact a heavy burden on their
victims, so any welfare calculation should weigh these crimes
more heavily. I measure crime severity in two ways. First, I use
estimates of the victimization cost of crimes produced by Miller,
Cohen, and Wiersema (1996). These estimates, which were also
used in an analysis of the of the MTO Demonstration by Kling,
Ludwig, and Katz (2005), consider tangible costs such as lost
productivity and medical care, as well as intangible costs such
as impact on quality of life, and are extremely high for fatal
crimes.25 To avoid the estimates being driven entirely by a few
25. Theestimatedsocialcostofmurderis$4.3millionin2009dollars. Thenext
costliest crime is rape, at about $125,000. Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema (1996)
do not include social cost estimates for drug crimes. Following Kling, Ludwig,
and Katz (2005), I assign costs to drug crimes according to felonies of equivalent
standing. IfinsteadIsetthecostofdrugcrimestozero, theestimatesfallbyabout
25% in the high school sample but are unaffectedfor middle schools.
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murders, I alsoreport results withthecost of murdertrimmedto
twice the cost of rape, following Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005).
The second measure of severity weighs crimes by the expected
punishment resulting from a successful conviction. In 1994 the
state of North Carolina enacted the Structured Sentencing Act.
Under structuredsentencing, felony convictions are groupedinto
classes based on severity. This information is combined with the
offender’s prior record and other circumstances to determine a
range of possible sentence lengths available tothe judge. I group
felonycharges accordingtotheirclass andassignthemidpoint of
therangeofsentencesforeachofthem.Whilebothmeasuresplace
averyhighweightonmurder, forexample, thesentenceweighted
measureisbetterabletocapturecriminalintent.26 Ialsoexamine
the effect of winning the lottery on total days incarcerated in the
countyjailandstateprisonsystems. Thesedataareonlyavailable
for African American male members of the sample, from 2006 to
thepresent. Sincemosthighschoolsamplememberswerealready
age 20 or older by 2006, I am missing prison time served during
the peak criminal offending ages of 18 to 19. Incarceration data
is likely tobe much more complete for the middle school sample,
however.
The main results of this article are in Figures II and III
and in Table IV. I first estimate Equation (2) for selected crime
outcomes and plot the point estimates and 90% confidence in-
tervals by arrest risk quintile in Figures II and III, for the
middle and high school samples, respectively. Each graph plots
the coefficients from a model like Equation (2), with a full set of
lottery status by risk quintile interactions. The p-values from F-
tests for equality of effects overall (and for each quintile, when
statistically significant) and equality of quintiles (in levels) are
displayed on each graph. In Figure II, we see that winning the
lottery leads to fewer felony arrests overall (p = .078), and the
effect is concentrated among the highest risk youth (0.77 felony
arrests for lottery losers, 0.43 for winners, p = .013). Similarly,
the trimmed social cost of crime is lower overall for lottery
winners (p = .040), but the effect is concentrated among the
top risk quintile youth ($11,000 for losers, $6,389 for winners,
26. Thedifferencebetweenmanslaughterandaggravatedassault oftencomes
down to luck (i.e., whether the bullet hit a critical organ or just missed it). The
social cost measure wouldtreat these twooutcomes very differently, whereas the
expectedsentence length for these twocrimes is very similar.
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FIGURE II
Impact of Winning the Lottery on Crime, by Arrest Risk Quintile
High School Sample
Each point estimate and 90% confidence interval are taken from a regres-
sion like Equation (2) where the lottery treatment is fully interacted with in-
dicators for whether a youth is in each risk quintile. F-tests for equality of
treatment and control groups across all five quintiles and for equality of quin-
tiles in levels are presented on each graph. The sample size is 1,014, except
for the Days in Prison outcome, which is available for African Americans only
(N = 610).
p=.036).Theconcentrationofeffectsinthetopriskquintileiseven
more pronounced for the middle school sample. The social cost
of arrested crimes is $12,500 for middle school lottery losers and
$4,643 for winners (p = .020), andthe effect for days incarcerated
is similarly large and concentrated among high-risk youth (55.5
days for losers, 17.2 for winners, p = .003). For each of the eight
outcomes in Figures II and III, the level of crime committed by
the top risk quintile is over twice that of the fourth quintile, and
we can reject equality of quintiles at the 10% level for all eight
outcomes.27
27. Although I donot report the test statistics, equality of the fourth andfifth
risk quintiles among lottery losers is rejected for all eight outcomes in Figures II
andIII.
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FIGURE III
Impact of Winning the Lottery on Crime, by Arrest Risk Quintile
Middle School Sample
Each point estimate and 90% confidence interval are taken from a regression
like Equation (2) where the lottery treatment is fully interacted with indicators
for whether a youth is in each risk quintile. F-tests for equality of treatment and
control groups across all five quintiles and for equality of quintiles in levels are
presented on each graph. The sample size is 1,081, except for the Days in Prison
outcome, which is available for African Americans only (N = 649).
Table IV shows regression results from a modifiedversion of
Equation (2) where the first four risk quintiles are pooled, but
the effect is allowed to vary for the top risk quintile.28 In the
first four columns I report estimates with the high and middle
school samples pooled, with separate coefficients (from the same
regression) for quintiles 1–4 and quintile 5. The first five rows
showresultsforarrestsoverallandbytypeofcrime. Thelastfour
rows show results for four measures of crime that are weighted
by severity—social cost without and with the cost of murder
trimmed, crimes weighted by expected sentence, and days incar-
cerated. The odd-numbered columns contain control means for
each outcome, and the even-numbered columns showcoefficients
28. The models in columns (5)–(8) are estimatedwith the first through fourth
risk quintile youth included, but I donot include the coefficients in the table.
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and standard errors. The first thing to note is the concentration
ofcrimewithinthetopriskquintile. High-riskyoutharearrested
about six times more often than the rest of the sample andspend
about nine times as many days incarcerated. These differences
are even larger for index violent crimes and drug felonies. This
and the graphical evidence in Figures II and III suggest that
thecrimepredictionmodel focuses theanalysis ontheright set of
youth.Topriskquintilelotterywinnershavefewernon-trafficand
felony arrests overall, although the results are not statistically
significant in the pooledsample.
Each of the outcomes in the last four rows of Table IV
weighscrimesbyseverity. Winningthelotteryledtoanestimated
reduction in the social cost of arrested crimes of over $30,000
for the top risk quintile, and over $12,000 for risk quintiles
1–4. Since more murders were committed by the control group
than the treatment group (five versus one in the combined high
andmiddleschool samples), theestimates arelargeandnegative
but relatively imprecise. When the cost of murder is trimmed,
the effect becomes smaller but more precise. Winning the lottery
led to a negative but insignificant drop of about $500 per male
applicant inthefirst throughfourthriskquintiles, but adecrease
ofover$6,000 permaleapplicant inthehighest riskquintile. The
effect for high-risk males is large (over 50% of the control mean)
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results are of
similar size and significance for the sentence-weighted measure
of crime severity. High-risk lottery winners commit crimes with
a total expected sentence of about 26 months, relative to about
52 months for lottery losers. Finally, high-risk lottery winners
spend about 40 days in prison, compared with 70 days for lot-
tery losers. Both the sentence weighted and days incarcerated
measures are statistically significant at the 5% level. The high
overall level of incarceration among high-risk youth is consistent
withnational trends-in2006–2007, about 23% of blackmalehigh
school dropouts in the United States were incarcerated on any
given day (Sum et al. 2009). Overall, high-risk lottery winners
experienced about a 50% reduction in the three measures that
index crimes by severity.
Columns(5)–(6)and(7)–(8)showthetopquintileresultsonly
forthehighandmiddleschoolsamples,respectively.Althoughthe
resultsforthemainoutcomesaresimilar, thepatternofeffectsby
felonyarrests is different ineachsample. Thehighschool sample
is arrested less often overall, and the impact is driven entirely
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by a 45% reduction in felony arrests, and within that a 70%
reduction in drug felony arrests. In contrast, there is no overall
reduction in arrests in the middle school sample. Instead, high
schoollotterywinnershaveabouttwiceasmanypropertyarrests,
but about 70% fewer violent felony arrests. Since these crimes
havethehighestsocialcostandarepunishedmostseverely, high-
risk middle school lottery winners show statistically significant
reductions in social cost, sentence weighted crimes, and days
incarcerated of about 60% to 65%. In Online Appendix Table IV
I present results separatedbyraceandgender. I findstatistically
significant reductions in crime for African American males over-
all, but nearly all of the results are statistically insignificant for
other subgroups.
Winningthemiddleschool lotteryleads tosubstitutionalong
the intensive margin of crime severity, and winning the high
schoollotteryleadstofewer(primarilydrug)arrestsoverall. Even
though the effects are driven by high-risk youth in both middle
and high schools, the middle school sample appears more crime-
prone overall. The average number of arrests is similar in the
top risk quintile for both samples, yet high school students have
had many more years to accumulate arrests (and the average
social cost of crimes is actually higher for the middle school sam-
ple). This is consistent with a developmental viewof criminality,
wheredelayingtheonsetofcriminaloffendingamongadolescents
alters their future trajectory and prevents very serious crimes
in the peak offending years (Moffitt 1993; Nagin and Tremblay
1999).
IV.B. Pattern of Results over Time
Tables V and VI present impacts on crime by years since
random assignment, for top-risk quintile high school and middle
school youth, respectively. Standarderrors are in brackets below
the estimates, followed by control means for each period in curly
brackets. AlthoughI estimatemodels withthefull sample, I only
report the point estimates for high-risk youth. The arrest mea-
sures in the first five rows are indicator variables that are equal
to1 iftheyouthwas arrestedat least onceineachyear.29 Wecan
see that the overall reduction in felony arrests is driven by years
four and five, when youth are around age 18–19 and no longer
29. Alternativemeasuressuchasnumberofarrestsornumberofchargesyield
substantively similar results andare available on request.
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enrolled in their first-choice school. This also holds for the social
costmeasure.ThelastrowofTableVshowsacumulativemeasure
of incarceration—whether a lottery applicant has spent 90 total
days incarcerated in any year. High school lottery winners are
about half as likely tohave been incarcerated90 or more days in
year five, but this gapcloses toonly one percentage point by year
seven.
Table VI presents the same set of results for high-risk youth
in the middle school sample. We can see that most of the overall
increaseinarrests comes inthelast 2 years, andthat it is driven
by nonviolent felonies. The decrease in violent felonies comes
earlier, in years five and six when the sample is around 17 years
old. High-risk middle school lottery winners have a lower (but
imprecisely estimated) social cost of arrested crimes and spend
statisticallysignificantlyfewerdaysincarceratedinall3yearsfor
which data are available. This reflects the fact that long prison
sentences are much more likely for violent offenders.30 Such a
large reduction in incarceration suggests that the increase in
arrests in later years among lottery winners might be partly
drivenbytheincapacitationofviolent felons, whoaremorelikely
to be in the group of lottery losers. We can see this with the
cumulativeincarcerationresultinthelastrow. Theshareofhigh-
risk youth who have been incarcerated for a total of 90 days or
more is much greater among those who lost the lottery, and a
reduction of about 8 percentage points (over 50% of the control
mean) persists for 7 years after random assignment.
IV.C. Other Outcomes
A key limitation of this analysis is that I do not observe
juvenile crime. This lack of early data couldmask big differences
in juvenile offending in the early years of the treatment. As an
alternative, Table VII shows the effect of winning the lottery on
school disciplinary outcomes such as absences and suspensions,
as well as test scores andcourse-taking. Becausenearlyall of the
impactsoncrimecomefromthehighestriskyouth,Ireportresults
forthehighestriskquintileonly, althoughthemodelisestimated
with all male members of the sample. The first two rows show
30. In the pooled sample, 30% of youth with at least one arrest for an index
violent crime but no property or drug arrests have spent 180 days or more
incarcerated. These figures are only 8% and 11% for property and drug arrests,
respectively.
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results forunexcusedabsences inthefirst 2 school years afterthe
treatment, andthenexttworowsshowthesamethingbutforout-
of-school suspensions. Overall, lottery winners in both samples
spend slightly more days in school. All four point estimates (2
samples, 2 years) for absences are negative, although only the
2003 middle school results are statistically significant. The effect
forhighschoolsuspensionsin2003 isrelativelylarge(areduction
of 3.7 from a baseline of 9.5 in the control group), but the other
effects are small and statistically insignificant. Finally, I find
that middle school lottery winners are less likely to be involved
in a disciplinary incident where the punishment was long-term
suspension, expulsion, or police involvement.31
Incontrasttotheresultsforcrimeanddisciplinaryoutcomes,
I find no evidence of test score gains.32 Results across various
test subjects andgrades are imprecise andnever distinguishable
from0, andinsomecases I canruleout evenmodest (i.e., greater
than0.1standarddeviations)gains.Finally,Iexamineimpactson
two measures of course-taking—whether a student was enrolled
in remedial math (defined as less than Algebra I by 9th grade,
whichisthelatestyearastudentcantaketheexamandgraduate
on time), and total math credits accumulated on EOC exams in
9th and 10th grade. High-risk lottery winners in high school are
much less likely to be enrolled in remedial math (19 percentage
points from a control group baseline of 37%). However, there
is no decrease in remedial math among lottery winners in the
middle school sample. The impact on math credits is positive but
imprecise in both samples.
Table VIII examines the effect of winning the lottery on
enrollment, grade progression, and grade attainment for high-
risk youth. The school enrollment measures in the first fourrows
classifyrespondents as enrolledif theyarepresent inCMS in the
31. I use a detailed disciplinary incident file maintained by CMS beginning
in the 2006–2007 school year. Thus I cannot look at incidents for the high
school sample at all or for any of the treatment years in the middle school
sample.
32. For the middle school sample, the test score measures are results from
standardized math and reading exams administered yearly for grades 3–8. High
schools administeraset ofend-of-course(EOC)exams insubjects suchas Algebra
I, Geometry, Biology, and English. However, they are not taken by all students
or even in the same grade in many cases, and so selection into test-taking may
compromise interpretation of the results. The one exception is English I, which is
takeninninthgradebyalmost all students, soI includeit as theonlyhighschool
test score measure.
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TABLE VIII
IMPACT OF WINNING THE LOTTERY ON HIGH SCHOOL ENROLLMENT
High schools Middle schools
Toprisk quintile Toprisk quintile
Enrollment (1) (2) (3) (4)
In CMS: Grade 9 year 0.930 0.014 0.767 0.032
[0.056] [0.054]
In CMS: Grade 10 year 0.673 −0.023 0.586 0.181   
[0.082] [0.068]
In CMS: Grade 11 year 0.541 0.052 0.519 0.091
[0.073] [0.076]
In CMS: Grade 12 year 0.348 0.008 0.376 −0.032
[0.080] [0.073]
Grade progression
“On Track”: Grade 9 year 0.698 0.146   0.534 0.032
[0.056] [0.054]
“On Track”: Grade 10 year 0.345 0.133 0.271 0.055
[0.084] [0.065]
“On Track”: Grade 11 year 0.207 0.121  0.233 −0.079
[0.071] [0.054]
“On Track”: Grade 12 year 0.163 0.030 0.173 −0.067
[0.071 [0.047]
Final status
CMS graduate 0.272 −0.029 0.105 −0.033
[0.089] [0.036]
Still enrolled: 2009 0.143 0.031
[0.064]
Verifieddropout (>9th Grade) 0.272 −0.064 0.226 0.103
[0.054] [0.065]
Transfer 0.207 0.098 0.278 −0.066
[0.083] [0.054]
Noshow 0.250 −0.003 0.248 −0.035
[0.052] [0.058]
Notes. Each point estimate is from a regression like Equation (2), where the lottery treatment variable
is interacted with indicators for whether an applicant is in the 1st–4th or 5th arrest risk quintiles. Results
are for males only. The Xij vector includes the prior year’s math and reading test scores, absences, and
out-of-school suspensions, plus indicators for race and free lunch status. Odd-numbered columns present
controlmeansforeachoutcome, andstandarderrorsarebeloweachestimateinbracketsandareclusteredat
the lottery (i.e., choice by priority group) level. The enrollment variables track whether a student is enrolled
in any CMS school in the year they would have been in each grade if they were progressing ”on time”. ”On
track” is defined as whether a student has advanced at least one grade per year since the lottery and is not
enrolled in an alternative school. See the text for a discussion of the final status variables.   = sig. at 10%
level;    = sig. at 5% level;     = sig. at 1% level.
year that they would have been in each grade if they progressed “on
time.” Forexample, risingsixth-gradelotteryapplicants wouldbe
enrolledinninthgradeinthe2005–2006schoolyear, soiftheyare
still enrolledin CMS at the endof 2006 they are counted, even if
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they are not in grade 9. High-risk middle school lottery winners
are18percentagepointsmorelikelytobeenrolledinCMSintheir
10th-gradeyear. Theeffecton11th-gradeenrollmentisabouthalf
thesize(9percentagepoints)butimpreciselyestimated,andthere
is noimpact on persistence intothe 12th-grade year.
Next I measure grade progression by counting students as
“ontrack”if theyhaveadvancedat least onegradeforeveryyear
sincethelotteryandarenotenrolledinanalternativeschool. The
pattern here is exactly the opposite as the results for enrollment.
High school lottery winners are more likely to be “on track” for
9th, 10th, and 11th grade. The estimates are of similar size in
absoluteterms(between12 and14 percentagepoints)butgrowin
relative terms, as lottery losers increasingly fall behind or enroll
in alternative schools. The effect fades to insignificance by 12th
grade,however.Incontrast,thereisnoeffectongradeprogression
for high-risk middle school lottery winners.
Despite the impacts on enrollment and progression, there is
nodetectableincreaseinhighschool graduationineithersample.
BecauseI amlimitedtoCMS administrativedata, it is difficult to
distinguishdropoutsfromsubsequentGEDrecipientsortransfers
whomayhavegraduatedelsewhere.33 Administrativerecordsare
particularly problematicfor high-risk youth, whoare marginally
attachedtoschoolandsometimesdisappearfromCMSwellbefore
thelegalageofschoolleaving.34 Thegraduationrateisonlyabout
25% among high-risk high school students, and currently only
about 10% amongmiddleschool students, althoughsomewhoare
still enrolled may subsequently graduate. Additionally, a bit less
than 10% of the middle school sample never appears in any high
schoolgradebutsubsequentlyappearsinthearrestdata. Because
any intervention aimedat high school students wouldmiss them
altogether, this suggests that highschool might betoolateforthe
highest risk youth.
33. Students who stop showing up for school are counted as either dropouts,
transfers, or no-shows, but there is considerable uncertainty across those cate-
gories. First, students are coded as dropouts only at age 16 and above. Second,
transfers (even out-of-state) often show up subsequently in the Mecklenburg
County arrest data.
34. Toillustrate the unreliability of exit coding, I calculate the average social
cost of crimes for members of the sample who are recorded as transfers versus
dropouts. Strikingly, despite the fact that some of the transfers are “real,” the
social cost of crime among them averages about $11,347, compared with $18,584
for verifieddropouts.
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V. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
V.A. Mechanisms: School Quality or Peer Effects?
Overall, I find that winning the lottery to attend a first
choice school has large impact on crime for high-risk youth.
In this section I discuss several possible explanations for the
results. Oneis that winningthelotteryentails longerbus rides to
and from school, incapacitating youth during high-crime hours.
More generally, winning the lottery could prevent crime by
removing high-risk youth from “criminogenic” peers or neigh-
borhoods (e.g., Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002;
Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 2005). Prominent models of criminal
contagiontreatindividualcrimeasafunctionofcontemporaneous
exposure to crime-prone peers (Sah 1991; Glaeser, Sacerdote,
and Scheinkman 1996; Ludwig and Kling 2007). However, both
incapacitationandcontagionexplanations wouldpredict astrong
initial effect that fades over time. If, for example, drug market
activity is concentrated within a few schools, we might expect
large differences in criminality in the high school years that
diminish as enrollment in the treatment school ends and lottery
winners and losers return tothe same neighborhoods. I conclude
that there is little support for these hypotheses since they donot
fit the pattern of results over time in Tables V and VI. It is also
possible that attending a better school decreases the probability
of arrest conditional on crime.35
Onecandidatehypothesisisthatthereductionincrimecomes
from the human capital returns to attending a higher quality
school. In a human capital framework, increased school quality
wouldraisethemarginal productivityof investment inschooling.
Youth who are given the opportunity to attend a better school
would stay enrolled longer and acquire more skills, which would
translate into a higher expected wage in the labor market. The
effectofwinningthelotteryislargestatageswhenmostyouthare
mixing schooling, crime and work in some combination (Grogger
1998). Higher wages raise the opportunity cost of crime and
incarceration, lowering the optimal amount of crime committed
(Lochner 2004). Tothe extent that skills acquired in school have
35. AlthoughIcannotprovideanydirectevidenceonthis, LochnerandMoretti
(2004) find that the relationship between schooling and incarceration in the
Censusissimilartotherelationshipbetweenschoolingandself-reportedcrime, at
least for white males. This suggests that higher levels of schooling donot greatly
alter the probability of arrest conditional on crime.
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a persistent effect on wages, reductions in crime would also be
persistent. Inbothsamplescombined, about80% ofstudentshave
already dropped out of school by the time they are arrested for
their first felony. Furthermore, even among the remaining 20%,
students with arrest records are often absent and/or suspended
for long stretches of time before an arrest occurs. Thus it is
plausible that keeping students enrolled longer, or maintaining
a stronger attachment to school, reduces the overall amount of
crimecommittedbydelayingtheonset of criminalitythroughthe
peakperiodofoffending(Moffitt1993; NaginandTremblay1999).
I test the school quality hypothesis by applying the changes
inenrollmentinTableVIIItomybestestimatesoftheirmarginal
impact on crime. Although the enrollment impacts in Table VIII
appear relatively weak, evidence from changes in compulsory
schoolinglawssuggeststhatevenoneadditionalyearofeducation
atarelativelylowlevelcanhavealargeimpactoncrime(Lochner
andMoretti 2004; Machin, Marie, andVujic2011). Usingthefull
nonlottery sample, I estimate a regression of the trimmed social
costofcrimemeasureonafullsetofdummyvariablesforwhether
students graduatedandwere enrolledand/or “on time”in grades
9–12, aset ofcovariates includingathird-orderpolynomial inthe
arrest prediction, and 2002 school fixed effects. I then multiply
those coefficients by the enrollment impacts in Table VIII and
backout theshareofthetotal reductioninthesocial cost ofcrime
that can be explainedby school enrollment.
For these regression coefficients to be unbiased estimates of
the marginal impact of an additional year of enrollment, it must
bethecasethatIhavecontrolledforallimportantdeterminantsof
crimethat arecorrelatedwithenrollment andthat theimpacts in
thenonlotterysampleholdforlotteryapplicantsaswell.Although
both of these assumptions are generous, the results from this
speculative, back-of-the envelope calculation are informative. I
findthatchangesinenrollmentcanpotentiallyexplainabout45%
oftheimpact inthehighschool sample, but onlyabout 10% inthe
middleschoolsample.Thisislargelybecause“ontime”enrollment
is a more important predictor of future crime than simply being
present in school, after adjusting for individual characteristics
andhome school fixedeffects.
Alternatively, peernetworks formedinmiddleorhighschool
could have a persistent influence on adult criminality without
affectinghumancapitalorwagesdirectly. Althoughthereismuch
evidence that social network formation is particularly important
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intheteenageyears(e.g., Evans,Oates,andSchwab1992;Haynie
2001; Sacerdote 2001), there is little available evidence on the
persistenceintoadulthoodof criminal ties formedinadolescence.
Itestthehypothesisthatincreasedexposuretocrime-pronepeers
in school-age years leads to more crime in adulthood. Similar
to the enrollment calculation, I multiply the change in lottery
winners’ peer criminality estimated in Table II by my best es-
timate of the impact of peer criminality on adult crime. Using
the nonlottery sample, I regress crime outcomes on the predicted
criminality of a student’s peers, a set of covariates including a
third-order polynomial in the student’s individual arrest predic-
tion, and prior year school fixed effects. I also include in the
regressionaquadraticinaveragepeercriminality, toseewhether
concentrations of high-risk peers have a nonlinear impact on
students’ own crime. Finally, following Hoxby and Weingarth
(2005) and Imberman, Kugler, and Sacerdote (2011), I allow the
impact of peer criminality to vary with the student’s own risk
quintile.
The results are in Table IX. Column (1) displays the impact
of peer criminality on high school students, column (2) adds a
quadratic in peer criminality, and column (3) allows the effect
to vary by students’ own risk quintile. Columns (4) through (6)
repeat this pattern for the middle school sample. The top half
of the table presents results for index violent crimes, and the
bottom half presents results for drug felonies.36 The patterns
are very different in the two samples and for the two types
of crime. I find very weak evidence for peer effects on violent
crimes in the high school sample. This may be due in part tothe
high rate of early dropout among violent felons. However, crime-
prone middle school peers increase own crime, and the impact is
much larger and statistically significant for youth in the top risk
quintile.
The impact for drug felonies, however, is much larger in
the high school sample and is nearly identical across risk quin-
tiles. Multiplying these estimates for the top risk quintile by the
changes in predicted criminality in Table III, I estimate that
changes in peers can explain only 9% of the impact on violent
arrests inthemiddleschool sampleand2% of theimpact ondrug
36. The results for the social cost of crime outcome are very similar to those
for index violent crimes but are much less precisely estimated. I present the drug
felonyresults as well becausethepatternis quitedifferent andbecausethecrime
reduction in the high school sample is driven by reductions in drug felonies.
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arrestsinthehighschoolsample.37 Moreover, sincethequadratic
termsincolumns(2)and(5)areallnegative, lookingonlyatyouth
in the most crime-prone schools would not increase the share
explainedby peers.
The pattern of impacts by risk quintile in columns (3) and
(6)has interestingimplications fortheaggregateimpact ofschool
choice. Theresults suggest that at least inmiddleschool, concen-
trating crime-prone youth in the same place may lead to more
crime in the aggregate. This matches results from other studies
whichsuggest that concentrations of disruptivechildrenincrease
overall misbehavior (Cook and Ludwig 2005; Carrell and Hoek-
stra 2010; Imberman, Kugler, andSacerdote 2011). As we sawin
Figure I, the net impact of school choice in CMS was to spread
high-risk youth across many more schools than if students were
only allowed to attend schools in their neighborhood zone. This
implies that school choicemayhavedecreasedtotal violent crime
among middle school youth, even after considering the possible
negative externality imposed by these youth on their new peers.
For drug felonies, however, there is noevidence that resorting of
students impacts aggregatelevels of drugcrime, sincetheimpact
ofanincreaseincrime-pronepeersisroughlyconstantacrossrisk
quintiles.
Theseback-of-theenvelopecalculations seemtosuggest that
peer effects are not large enough to explain much of the impact
of winning the lottery on crime. However, it is important to
remember that lottery applicants are a self-selectedsample. It is
very plausible that high-risk lottery applicants are in the sample
because they (or more likely, their families) are trying to escape
the negative influence of particular peers in their neighborhood
school. In that sense the impact of winning the lottery could be
driven by match-specific peer effects that would not show up in
the calculations above. This would also explain why significant
numbers of rising seventh and eighth graders applied to the lot-
tery, andwhyhigh-risklotterylosers wereless likelytoreturnto
theirneighborhoodschools thanlotterylosers inthefirst through
fourth risk quintiles.
Given this concern and the loose nature of the calculations,
we should interpret the estimated share of the impact explained
37. Part of the difference is explained by the fact that middle school youth
alsoattendhighschool withless crime-pronepeers, but evenwithout addinghigh
school peereffects the share explainedin the middle school sample is about three
times higher.
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by enrollment impacts (45% in high school and 10% in middle
school)andpeers(2% inhighschooland9% inmiddleschool)with
an abundance of caution. Rather than interpreting the numbers
literally, we could surmise that the human capital/school quality
mechanism is more important for high school lottery winners,
whereas peer effects are more important in middle school. This
matches some of the evidence from Table III. High school lottery
winners experienced larger gains in measured teacher quality
andrevealedpreferenceandweremorelikelytoattenda magnet
school. Furthermore, the most commonly chosen school in the
high school sample was a magnet career academy, which has
been shown to increase earnings among minority males without
improvingtest scores orthelikelihoodofgraduation(Kempleand
Willner 2008). In contrast, much more of the gain in measured
school quality comes from peer test scores and demographics in
the middle school sample.
V.B. Policy Simulation and Welfare Implications
Because criminal involvement can be predicted using infor-
mation that is readily available to the school district, a lottery
mechanism that gives priority to high-risk youth could reduce
crimemoreeffectively. Toquantifythebenefitsoftargeting, Isim-
ulate the lottery andresulting distribution of students toschools
undertwoalternativeassignment rules. First, I assignopenslots
tothehighest riskstudents (basedonthepredictiongeneratedin
Section III.A.) in descending order, for each lottery. While such
an allocation system would be controversial, it is feasible since
all the covariates are available to the school district. Second, I
simulateasimplelotterywithnoprioritygroupings,similartothe
decentralized lotteries conducted by many U.S. charter schools.
The CMS lottery system assigneda “priority boost” toFRPL stu-
dentswhoappliedtoschoolswithalowfractionofFRPLstudents
inthepreviousyear. Asaconsequence, manypoor(andhighcrime
risk)students wereautomaticallyadmittedtoschools whenother
students had to win the lottery (or, in some cases, only FRPL
studentscouldbeadmitted,andnootherstudentswereadmitted).
For both assignment rules, I simulate the lottery 500 times
andcalculatethenewexpecteddistributionofstudentstoschools.
In the last step, I use the original parameter values from the es-
timationof Equation(2) forthesocial cost of crimeoutcome. This
calculationmakessomeimportantassumptions. First, itassumes
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that students’ choices werenot strategic, andthus theywouldnot
have changed their preferences if the assignment rules changed.
Second, itassumesthattherelationshipIestimatebetweencrime
risk andthe social cost outcome is validout of sample. Finally, it
assumesthattherearenodifferentialspillovereffectsfromlottery
winners totheir schoolmates under each scenario.
I estimate that if slots in oversubscribed schools were allo-
cated to the highest risk students, the social cost of crime would
fall by an additional 27% relative to the actual CMS assignment
mechanism. A more realistic form of targeting is the method
actually pursued by CMS—a “priority boost” for economically
disadvantagedstudents. Iestimatethatthispolicychoicelowered
the social cost of crime by about 12%, relative toa simple lottery
withnopreferential treatment. Most ofthedifferencecomes from
changes in the middle school lottery, for two reasons. First, the
effect is more strongly increasing in crime risk for the middle
school lottery than for the high school lottery (see Figures II
and III). Second, there is much less sorting across choices at the
middleschoollevel, sotherearemanylow- andhigh-riskstudents
applying tothe same schools.
CMS chose to implement an open enrollment school choice
plan as an alternative to a traditional neighborhood schools
model. They expanded capacity at schools where high demand
was anticipated, including magnet schools that were located in
the inner city. These schools increased yearly enrollment sub-
stantially and were in many cases still oversubscribed. Many
low-performing schools, on the other hand, experienced large
reductionsinenrollment—byasmuchas50%insomecases.Thus,
relative to a pure neighborhood schools model, the net effect of
open enrollment was to increase access to magnet and highly
demanded schools for youth who would not otherwise be able to
enroll. This strongdemandresponsemeans that thetreatment is
not just a transfer from losers to winners and could represent a
real welfare gain.
All the results so far have been ITT estimates of the effect
of winning the lottery. However, we can alsocalculate LATEs for
youthwhocomplywiththeirlotterystatus, usingthelotteryasan
instrumentforenrollment.38 Sincetheaverage“first-stage”effect
38. The IV estimates are only valid if the monotonicity assumption (“no
defiers”—i.e., noapplicant would have enrolled if they lost or not enrolled if they
won) holds (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996). The group of compliers is a latent
type, sincewecannotdirectlyobservewhoamongthecomplierlotteryloserswould
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was around 0.55, the LATEs are a bit less than double the ITT
estimatesforeachoutcome. FollowingHoxbyandMurarka(2009)
andAbdulkadirogluet al. (2011), I canalsocalculatetheper-year
effect of enrollment in a first choice school. This is particularly
large for high-risk youth—each year of enrollment saves society
over $55,000 in criminal victimization costs for arrested crimes.
Finally, I use the lottery as an instrument for the quality of
the school attended by applicants in fall 2002. I calculate the
average of the four normalized school quality measures in Table
II. Assuming that all the treatment effect operates through mea-
sured school quality, a one standard deviation increase in school
quality leads to a reduction in the social cost of arrested crimes
of about $23,000 per applicant and about $110,000 per high-risk
youth.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article I estimate the longer-term impact on adult
crime of winning an admissions lottery toattend a better middle
or high school. I find that winning the lottery greatly reduces
crime, and the impact is concentrated among the highest risk
youth in the sample. The impacts persist beyond the years of
schoolenrollment, 7 yearsafterrandomassignment. Thefindings
suggest that schools may be a particularly important setting
for the prevention of future crime. Many high-risk youth in the
sampledropoutofschoolataveryyoungageandareincarcerated
for serious crimes prior tothe age of high school graduation. For
theseyouthonthemargins of society, publicschools maypresent
the best opportunity tointervene.
Theendofbusingandtheimplementationofopenenrollment
in CMS was a significant policy change. The four neighborhood
highschoolstowhichmostofthelotteryapplicantswereassigned
lost over 20% of their enrollment in a single year. In subsequent
years, two of these schools were restructured as magnet schools
that offered a series of specialized programs in a small school
setting. Similarly, two middle schools with significant student
out-migration were subsequently closed. In this way, the open
enrollmentpolicysentastrongsignalofparentaldemandtoCMS
have enrolledif they hadwon (andvice versa for winners). Empirically, observed
compliers are drawn from the middle of the distribution of arrest risk relative to
the lottery loser “always-takers”andthe lottery winner “never-takers.”
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that may have resulted in shutting down or restructuring low-
performing schools. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in-
cludeda provisionthat allowedparents totransferstudents from
“persistentlydangerous”publicschools, but manystates haveset
the legal threshold so high that very few schools qualify. The
results here suggest that to the extent that low-quality schools
are alsopersistently dangerous, allowing students toleave them
for a better school might benefit individual students as well as
society as a whole.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
An Online Appendix for this article can be found at QJE
online (qje.oxfordjournals.org).
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